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Restrictive employment protection legislation has been highlighted as one of the key 
reasons for lower labour productivity in Europe compared to the US. A variety of channels 
have been suggested, including recently a focus on the direct effect of employment protection 
on worker effort decisions. This paper uses longitudinal data from Spain and legislative 
changes aimed at reducing the incidence of temporary employment to estimate the causal 
effect of employment protection on one aspect of effort, absenteeism. We demonstrate a large 
effect of employment protection on absenteeism, one that is markedly larger than that 
identified in previous studies. We then use this information to estimate the cost of this 
absence in terms of lost productivity.  Our results suggest that cross-countries differences in 
employment protection can, through its effect on worker effort, have a substantial impact on 
labour productivity.  
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Differences in labour productivity between Europe and the US are an issue of long-
standing concern (Prescott, 2004; Timmer and van Ark, 2005 and van Ark et al., 2008). A 
range of explanations have been posited to explain these differences. For instance, it has been 
suggested that the `knowledge economy’ emerged much more slowly in Europe when 
compared to the US (Aghion et al., 2004; van Ark et al., 2008). Another explanation, and a 
highly contentious one, is that markedly more strict employment protection legislation (EPL) 
in Europe leads to lower labour productivity (Bassanini et al., 2009; Dolado and Stucchi, 
2008; Capellari et al., 2012). 
EPL has the potential to affect productivity through its influence on labour market 
transitions and unemployment; this has been the source of a large and contentious literature 
(Lazear, 1990; Addison et al., 2000; Blanchard and Portugal, 2001; Acemoglu and Angrist, 
2001 and Kugler and Pica, 2008). EPL could also influence worker productivity more 
directly through its effects on worker effort decisions (Dolado and Stucchi, 2008 and Dolado 
et al., 2011). Recently, a literature has developed that seeks to estimate the effect of 
employment protection legislation on worker effort, focusing primarily on absenteeism 
(Riphahn and Thalmaier, 2001; Ichino and Riphahn, 2004 and 2005; Engellandt and Riphahn, 
2005; Olsson, 2009, Scoppa, 2010 and Bradley et al., 2012). This literature can be 
summarised as showing statistically significant effects of employment protection on 
absenteeism; more employment protection increases absenteeism. While these papers 
compare worker behaviour across large variations in employment protection, it must be 
recognised that the economic magnitude of these estimated effects are quite small. For 
instance, Ichino and Riphahn (2005) show that Italian bank workers who pass a 12 week 
probation period increase absence by 0.04 of a day per week, while Bradley et al., 2012 show 
that public sector workers who move from temporary to permanent contracts increase 
absence by 0.017 of a day per week. These effects appear too small to lead to large cross-
country differences in labour productivity. Other studies find larger effects but in quite 
specific small firm settings. Olsson (2009) finds a decrease in sickness absence of 13% 
among firms of less than 10 workers in Sweden who experienced a reduction in employment 
protection strength. While, Scoppa (2010) examine the effect of an increase in dismissal costs 
in small Italian firms and find an increase in sickness absence of 18%. In this paper we revisit 
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this issue and provide new evidence on EPL effects on worker absence across an entire 
labour market relying on legislative changes in Spain.  
In the European context the key variation in employment protection relates to 
differences between temporary / fixed term contracts and permanent contracts. Temporary 
contracted workers are relatively easy to fire or face non-renewal of contract while the 
dismissal of permanent workers is extremely difficult and in the case of success may still 
impose large costs on the employer. Spain is a particularly interesting case as it is known 
both for very stringent employment protection legislation for permanent employees and at the 
same time has the highest incidence of temporary employment contracts in the EU. More 
than 30% of the Spanish workforce over the 1990-2007 period was employed on a fixed-term 
contract (Bentolila et al., 2008). Moreover, this can be viewed as essentially a segmented 
labour market as transitions from temporary to permanent contracts are quite uncommon. For 
instance, there is no evidence that these temporary contracts are associated with a higher 
likelihood of transition into permanent employment when compared to being unemployed 
(Güell and Petrongolo, 2007).  
The temptation in this context is to compare permanent and temporary workers to 
provide an estimate of the effect of employment protection on absenteeism. However, the 
identification of the effect of temporary employment on workers’ effort is complicated by a 
number of issues related to non-random selection of workers into employment contracts. 
First, temporary jobs are not randomly distributed across the labour market and are, for 
instance, concentrated amongst the young, women, immigrants and the less skilled (Kahn, 
2007). Moreover temporary jobs are characterised by features that may make them on 
average less desirable, such as lower levels of work-related training (Arulampalam and 
Booth, 1998; Draca and Green, 2004), lower wages (Booth et al., 2002), poorer working 
conditions, and increased risk of work-related accidents (Guadalupe, 2003). A further 
complication is that these contracts could be used for specific reasons that may condition 
effort choices. For instance, they may be used by employers as a buffer against cyclical 
fluctuations and/or for screening purposes. In the latter case, under imperfect information 
regarding their productivity, this may lead temporary workers to increase their effort so as to 
augment their probability of being retained by the firm. Along these lines, Booth et al., 
(2002) find evidence that temporary jobs are stepping stones to permanent work for female 
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workers in the UK. While, Green and Leeves (2004) provide evidence that some Australian 
employers use temporary workers as part of a screening process.  
Together this suggests a variety of common unobserved factors that influence both the 
probability of being hired on a temporary contract and effort choices by workers. In 
particular, there may exist important omitted individual characteristics, such as motivation 
and ability, which lower the opportunity cost of being hired on a temporary basis. This gives 
rise to an endogeneity problem that leads to biased and inconsistent estimates of the causal 
effect of temporary employment on absenteeism. Fixed effects models which take into 
account worker level unobserved heterogeneity and/or instrumental variable approaches are 
two potential solutions to this problem. Each in isolation is open to criticism. Fixed effect 
approaches control for time-invariant characteristics associated with both effort and 
employment contract but cannot control for time-varying factors that cause worker 
assignment to permanent contracts. IV estimation relies on plausible exogenous assignment 
to contract type that is a function of a suitable instrument. Our paper uses a longitudinal 
representative data for Spain and recent policy changes that allow us to use both of these 
approaches in combination to estimate the effect of temporary employment, and through this 
employment protection, on worker absence.  
Specifically, this paper investigates the effect of temporary contracts on workers’ 
effort by adopting an IV Fixed Effects framework that exploits two employment protection 
reforms as a source of exogenous variation in temporary employment and then estimates 
within worker variation in absence. Previous research has already shown that these types of 
reforms affect the likelihood of being employed on a temporary contract. Kahn (2010) finds 
an effect of employment protection reforms on the incidence of temporary jobs for the 
countries of the EU-15 from 1996 to 2001. Dolado et al., (2011) use the 1994, 1997 and 2002 
reforms to identify the exogenous variation in the share of temporary workers within firms so 
as to evaluate the impact of the extended use of temporary contracts on the productivity of 
Spanish manufacturing firms. Kugler et al., (2005) demonstrates an increase in permanent 
employment for workers under 30 and over 45 years old with a difference in difference 
analysis for a 1997 reform in Spain. Spain presents the ideal scenario to analyse the effect of 
temporary employment on absence. This is due to the large scale of temporary work in Spain 
and the sequence of reforms that have been introduced in the last decade to reduce the use of 
these contracts. Using this setting, we extend earlier research (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; 
5 
 
Olsson 2009; Scoppa 2011) to cover general reforms that affect all workers and as a result 
can be viewed as providing more readily generalisable estimates of employment protection 
effects.  
We find an effect of temporary employment on absence that is in the range of 0.3 of a 
day per week, which we argue is causal. This estimate is substantially larger than that 
reported in the previous literature (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Olsson, 2009; Scoppa, 2011; 
Bradley et al., 2012) and we argue that it is of an economically significant magnitude. Our 
institutional setting covers an entire labour market, where temporary workers may be 
employed in a variety of occupational and industry settings. We demonstrate that our primary 
source of variation, reforms to employment protection, influence the assignment of workers 
to types of employment contracts throughout the labour market. Our results add to previous 
research by providing causal evidence of employment protection effect on absence in a 
broader economic and labour market setting. Finally, using a particular subset of workers, 
young unskilled construction workers, we provide the first estimates of productivity effects 
associated with absenteeism and contract re-assignment.  
   
II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND DATA 
Institutional background 
Spain’s labour market is characterised by high unemployment and high rates of 
temporary employment; the latter is the highest in Europe (14% and 33% in the EU-27 and 
Spain in 2005, respectively). Figure 1 demonstrates the evolution of the rate of temporary 
employment in Spain and the countries of the EU-15 and EU-27 (See Dolado et al., (2002) 
for a survey on temporary employment in Spain).  
    INSERT FIGURE 1 
Temporary contracts in their modern form were introduced in Spain in 1984 as an 
attempt to combat high unemployment rates. Specifically, a contract (Contrato temporal de 
fomento de empleo) was created under which individuals could be hired for a maximum 
duration of three years, with no constraints. Temporary contracts did exist prior to this (from 
1976 on) but were only allowed in jobs that were temporary in nature, such as seasonal work. 
The 1984 legislative change removed this link between temporary work and job type. This 
reform led to a large and rapid increase in the use of temporary contracts. While there was no 
6 
 
necessary link between job and contract type, in reality the growth in temporary contracts 
was concentrated in what could be considered “lower quality” jobs. Dismissal of temporary 
contract workers was relatively easy with no dismissal compensation. In contrast, permanent 
workers remained very hard to dismiss. Permanent workers must receive 30 days notice of 
dismissal. If the dismissal is due to objectively bad conduct of the worker there is no further 
compensation. However, if the dismissal is due to poor demand conditions of the firm, 
dismissed workers receive 20 days full pay per year worked with the firm up to a maximum 
of 12 months full pay. If the dismissal is for any other reasons, compensation rises to 45 days 
per year worked with a maximum of 42 months full pay. In practice, most dismissals are not 
for the first two reasons and maximum compensation is paid. Moreover, if a dismissal was 
contested by the worker for being unfair and subsequently judged against the firm (i.e. unfair 
dismissal) they had to pay full wages for the period between dismissal and trial. This coupled 
with the relatively slow time to trial in Spain implies a large additional dismissal cost. 
Together, this helps to explain why temporary contracts proliferated once they were 
introduced.   
The scale of the temporary employment sector generated by the original reform was 
eventually viewed as undesirable and has led to a number of subsequent reforms aimed at 
reducing the level of temporary employment, and reducing the size of the disparity between 
permanent and temporary contract conditions. Of specific interest is the series of reforms that 
began in 1997. In 1997 a new type of permanent contract was created (Contrato de Fomento 
de la Contratacion Indefinida, CFCI). The key characteristics were pay tax breaks for 2 years 
for firms to hire a worker on this type of contract, and lower potential dismissal costs than 
standard permanent contracts. The lower dismissal costs of CFCI workers primarily took the 
form of a lower level of compensation of 33 days full pay per year worked (as compared to 
45 for other permanent workers) and a reduction in the maximum period of full pay from 42 
to 24 months. Only certain groups of workers could be offered these contracts, 18-29 year 
olds, workers older than 45 years, long-term unemployed (at least one year), disabled workers 
and workers currently on temporary contracts within the firm. The eligible groups were 
subsequently expanded in 2001 to also include 16 and 17 year olds, unemployed women 
between 16 and 45 years old, those unemployed for at least 6 months and women in sectors 
where they were under-represented. Another key change that reduced the `distance’ between 
contract types was that temporary contract workers were now eligible for dismissal 
compensation of 8 days in some cases. 
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Further reforms on the 14
th
 of December 2002, extended this contract to women who 
gave birth in the last 24 months, but also introduced `express dismissal’ (despido express). 
This lowered dismissal costs of all permanent workers markedly as the employer did not have 
to pay processing wages if they accepted that the dismissal was unfair within 48 hours, but 
still had to pay dismissal compensation. Finally in 2006 (active from the 31
st
 December 2006) 
these CFCIs were extended to cover essentially all workers. In addition, the tax breaks for 
hiring these workers were changed from a proportion of the wage to a specific amount, which 
favours the hiring of lower wage workers on these contracts. The period of payment of these 
breaks was also extended from 2 to 4 years.  
In terms of the impact of these reforms on the Spanish labour market, previous 
research demonstrates that the reforms of the 1990s had a very limited effect on the use of 
employment contracts in Spain (see for instance Kugler et al., 2005; García Perez and 
Rebollo, 2009a and 2009b and Mendez, 2012). By the mid-2000s, the share of temporary 
jobs remained very high and the conversion rate into open-ended contracts remained low and 
stable at around 4% of the total number of contracts (Bentolila et al., 2008). Since the 
approval of the 2006 reform, there has been a substantial reduction in the temporary 
employment rate but part of the reduction can be attributed to the large destruction of 
temporary jobs in the construction industry. However, we will demonstrate that the 2002 and 
2006 reforms have an effect on the temporary mechanism in Spain and this constitutes a key 




The data we use in this paper are drawn from the Longitudinal Spanish Labour Force Survey 
(herein LSLFS). The LSLFS is a quarterly representative survey that provides a range of 
information on individual and work characteristics. It is a rotating panel data set that follows 
individuals for 6 consecutive quarters. It contains 1,430,599 observations for 506,252 
different individuals in the period spanning 1
st
 quarter of 2002 to 4
th
 quarter of 2008.
2
 The 
chosen period is crucial for identification purposes since it contains several labour market 
reforms and both the period and the reforms are not associated with any major economic 
                                                          
1
 In unreported estimates we found no effect of the 2001 reform on the probability of being hired on a 
permanent contract. Previous research has considered the 2001 and 2002 reforms jointly (Bentolila et al., 2008). 
2
 The Spanish Labour Force Survey has been demonstrated to have an internationally consistent definition of 





 This ensures that the decrease in temporary employment is not due to a general drop 
in labour demand and employment levels. 
INSERT FIGURE 2a and 2b 
Information on usual and actual hours of work per week forms the basis of our 
measures of both the extensive and intensive margins of absence. The extensive margin is a 
variable that takes value 1 when usual hours are greater than actual hours and value 0 if they 
are the same.
4
 The intensive margins of absence are calculated as deviations from contractual 
hours either in absolute terms or as an absence rate. We calculate the hours a worker is absent 
per week as the difference between usual and actual hours, eit
u
itit HHA  .
5
 For ease of 
interpretation we multiply this number by 60 so that the estimated coefficients are in terms of 
minutes of absence. The absence rate is defined as the ratio of the hours reported absent to 
contractual hours in the reference week uititit HAAR  . This approach has previously been 
used by Barmby et al., (1999 and 2002) for the UK, eight European Countries and Canada, 
Lozano (2011) for the US and Green and Navarro (2012) for Spain.  
Figure 2 uses this definition of minutes difference due to absence to provide 
preliminary evidence on the association between absence and contract type. To aid 
presentation we plot these as 5 year moving averages. Two things are notable. First there is a 
marked and stable difference over time in the absence levels of temporary and permanent 
contract employees. For instance, temporary workers are, on average, absent from work 90 
minutes less a week than permanent workers. Second, overall absence levels for both types of 
workers are high. This in part reflects the choice to differences in usual and actual hours due 
to all types of absence such as personal/family responsibilities, paternity leave, bad weather, 
summer schedule/flexible hours, holidays, local or national bank holidays, sickness, training, 
employment change, strike, union representation and “other reasons”. That is, we use 
information on the difference between usual hours and actual hours for those that report the 
reason of any difference between them as due to sickness to generate our narrower dependent 
                                                          
3
 We stop our sample just after the fall of Lehman Brothers which could be considered as the start of the 
financial crisis. 
4
 In the results we examine the case of overtime work which may also be influenced by employment contracts. 
5
 Where usual hours is taken as synonymous to contractual hours. 
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variables. However, we stress that our main results are robust to using narrower definitions of 
absence. 
We focus on employees and Table A1 presents summary statistics on the variables 
used in the empirical analysis. These include dummies for each of the age brackets, gender, 
marital status and education level. Also included are controls for the worker’s type of 
contract and whether the individual works in the public sector, along with tenure, tenure 
squared, industry and occupation dummies. Finally, in all the empirical modelling we use 
year, quarter and regional fixed effects so as to take regional, seasonal, and time variations 
into account. 
 
III. METHODOLOGY AND IDENTIFICATION 
Our identification approach draws upon Kahn (2010) who demonstrates the effect of 
European employment protection reforms on the incidence of temporary work contracts. 
Specifically, we use the 2002 and 2006 employment protection reforms as a source of 
exogenous variation in the assignment of contract type.
6
 The standard identifying assumption 
is that the chosen instrumental variables, employment protection legislation (EPL) reforms, 
are relevant and validly excluded. The relevance condition requires that there is a correlation 
between these reforms Z and the likelihood of temporary employment   0, itTCZE . With 
respect to the validity condition, our assumption is that reforms affect workers absence 
behaviour only through its effect on temporary contracts but not directly   0, itZE  . An 
argument in support of this assumption is that government policy aimed at introducing 
temporary contracts and reducing dismissal costs has had the primary objective of fighting 
high unemployment. Although workers absence leads to significant costs for firms, and in 
some countries like Spain absence levels are very high, governments have generally ignored 
this aspect when designing employment protection reforms.
7
 Furthermore, it has been shown 
that there is no effect of these EPL reforms on the overall employment level in Spain (Kahn, 
2010). In the results section we further discuss the statistical validity of our instruments. 
                                                          
6
  Similarly, Dolado et al., (2011) use the 1994, 1997 and 2001/2002 Spanish labour market reforms to identify 
the exogenous variation in the shares of temporary workers when they evaluate the impact of the extended use 
of temporary contracts on the productivity of Spanish manufacturing firms. 
7
 The Labour Reform that occurred in February 2012 is the first reform in Spain that explicitly includes 
measures that aim to reduce work absenteeism. 
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We present OLS, Fixed Effects and IV estimates of the effects of temporary contracts 
on worker’s absence behaviour based on variants of the following specification: 
,itititiit XTCA                                                                                                      (1) 
ititiit vXRRTC   20062002                                                                                (2) 
Equation (1) provides the effect of being employed on a temporary contract, itTC , on  
workers’ absence behaviour, itA . itTC  is a dummy variable which takes value 0 if the worker 
is hired under a permanent contract and 1 under a temporary one. Our dependent variable, itA  
is measured either at the extensive or the intensive margin of absence (absence incidence 
versus minutes difference or absence rate).  
Equation (2) provides the relationship between the probability of being employed on a 
temporary contract to the reforms of 2002 and 2006. R2002 and R2006 are indicators that 
take the value of unity if the worker is observed during the reform period and zero otherwise 
(from the 14
th
 of December 2002 and 31
st
 of December 2006, respectively).   and   provide 
the percentage effect of those reforms on reductions in the probability of temporary 
employment in Spain. X  is a set of standard control variables such as age dummies, gender, 
marital status, education, sector of employment, tenure and tenure squared, year, industry, 
occupation, regional and quarter dummies. 
We then further extend our analysis to utilise the longitudinal nature of our data by 
estimating a variant of the IV model above including worker fixed effects (FE-IV). This 
model identifies the within worker change in absence behaviour due to re-assignment of 
contract type that results from the legislative change.  
IV. RESULTS 
Table 1 reports regression estimates of the effect of being employed on a temporary 
contract on absence. We use a simple Linear Probability Model (LPM) for the extensive 
margins of absence and OLS estimates for the intensive margins, that is, both for the minutes 
difference and the absence rate variables/models.
8
 Our findings provide evidence that 
temporary workers exert more effort as they are absent 43 minutes less on average than 
                                                          
8
 The sign, magnitude and significance of our estimates were unaffected when we estimated the absence rate 
with a Tobit model that takes censoring into account. 
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permanent workers (-0.016 at the extensive margin and -0.016 for the absence rate). These 
differences are substantially lower than that apparent in the raw data. This suggests that 
permanent contract workers have ‘unfavourable’ observable characteristics in terms of 
absence propensity. Once these characteristics are held constant the contract absence gap 
narrows substantially. This is perhaps not surprising as permanent workers are on average 
older, more likely to be in the public sector and have longer tenure: all known positive 
correlates of absenteeism. This is supported by the fact that excluding these controls leads to 
a markedly larger estimate temporary contract effect on absence. For instance, the estimate of 
temporary contract effects on minutes difference increases to 63.  
INSERT TABLE 1 
These marked observable differences lead naturally to a concern regarding the 
comparability of the treatment and control group. Permanent and temporary contracts are not 
randomly distributed across the Spanish labour market and this leads to concerns about the 
comparability of these two groups absences. We seek to address this primarily by examining 
the robustness of our results to the exclusion of groups where temporary work is likely to be 
very uncommon. For instance, temporary contracts are heavily concentrated in short tenure 
jobs. Hence, we remove workers with 5 or more years’ tenure. They are also heavily 
concentrated in the private sector. This is not surprising as in the public sector the selection 
criteria for new hires does not include tax breaks for hiring temporary workers. As a result, 
we also exclude public sector workers from the following estimates.
 9
  The absence behaviour 
of the permanent and temporary workers in this short tenure private sector subsample are 
closer than in the overall sample. Temporary workers are absent 177.05 minutes, while 
permanent workers are absent 219.49 minutes. The corresponding figures for the absence rate 
are 8.38% and 10.06%, respectively.  
Table 2 reports the OLS and FE estimates for this selected sample. When compared to 
the earlier results, these exclusions lead to a marked decrease in our contract estimate from 43 
to 19 minutes of general absence, and -0.016 to -0.008 and -0.016 to -0.005 in the extensive 
margin and absence rate, respectively. Nonetheless, even in this more homogenous group, we 
observe a statistically significant conditional relationship between contract type and absence. 
                                                          
9
 In unreported estimates we also use the approach set out by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) to remove all 
observations not in the common support region after estimating a matching model of contract type. While this 
necessarily leads to a reduction in the sample size, the OLS and FE estimates of contract effects on absence are 
essentially unchanged following this procedure.  
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In the next column we exploit the longitudinal nature of the data and introduce worker 
level fixed effects. When we take into account time invariant worker heterogeneity the 
coefficient falls further to 15 minutes. This could be viewed as a lower bound estimate if we 
believed there was measurement error in the contract type variable and hence attenuation bias 
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009, pp. 225-226). However, given the stark differences in 
employment protection between contract types in Spain it seems quite unlikely that workers 
are unaware of which contract they are employed under.  
A concern with our measures of absence is that for workers who experience variations 
in their contractual hours, such as part time workers, there may be substantial measurement 
error in our absence measures.
10
 Furthermore, part-time workers are more likely to be 
employed on temporary contracts. As a result, in the next two columns we report OLS and FE 
estimates for full-time workers only. While, this leads to some change in point estimates, 
these are not particularly marked. In unreported estimates we take this a step further and limit 
our sample to those workers who were observed in all 6 periods in a full time job. Re-
estimating our FE models on this balanced panel of full-time workers revealed an essentially 
unchanged set of contract estimates.  
INSERT TABLE 2 
To accept the current results as causal would require an assumption that contract 
status was randomly assigned in the OLS conditional on observed characteristics; and in the 
FE context that they are randomly assigned conditional on observed characteristics and time 
invariant unobserved characteristics.  For a number of reasons discussed earlier this is 
unlikely to hold. As a result we seek to address this problem in a number of ways. First we 
seek to take advantage of the labour reforms of 2002 and 2006 as a source of exogenous 
variation in the likelihood of being hired on a temporary contract. Panel A of Table 3 
provides LPM estimates of the probability of being on a temporary employment contract with 
the key focus being the estimates of the effects of the reforms.
11
 These demonstrate that these 
reforms appear to have had a substantial effect in decreasing the likelihood of being 
employed on a temporary basis. In particular, the 2002 reform that came into force the 14
th
 of 
                                                          
10
 It is worth noting however that our estimates based on absence rate implicitly controls for variation in 
contractual hours.  
11
 In unreported estimates, we ran the absence incidence model as a probit and the marginal effects were 
essentially identical in terms of magnitude and statistical significance to those obtained via LPM. 
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December 2002 decreased the probability of being on a fixed-term contract by 6 percent. The 
corresponding figure for the 2006 reform is a decrease by 2 percent of the probability of 
being on a fixed-term contract. The reforms appear to be suitable instruments as they are 
statistically strong with an F-test value for the exclusion restriction of 518.04. In addition, we 
cannot reject the assumption that our reforms are unrelated to our dependent variable, that is, 
absenteeism at the 1% level. Together this suggests that the reforms provide strong and valid 
instruments. 
INSERT TABLE 3 
The IV estimates indicate that temporary workers are absent 144 minutes less than 
permanent workers. This is markedly higher than the 19 minutes for the OLS estimates, but 
closer to the magnitude of contract variation in absence seen in the raw data of 90 minutes. 
This suggests that the OLS and FE estimates substantially understate the effect of contract 
status, and hence employment protection, on worker absence behaviour.  
We then further extend this to incorporate worker time invariant unobservables that 
may be correlated with both contract re-assignment and absence behaviour. We do this by 
introducing the IV estimation in a worker fixed effects context (FE-IV). Estimates of these 
models are reported in the final two columns of Table 3. The first thing to note is that while 
both the policy reforms remain strong predictors of contract type in a fixed effects context, 
the relative magnitude of the two reforms has changed. Specifically, the 2002 reform is now 
associated with a lower, but still substantial, decrease in the likelihood of being on a 
temporary contract of 3.8 percentage points. The 2006 reform is now associated with a much 
larger decrease in temporary contract probability of 7.2 percentage points. These estimates, 
especially the 2006 effect seems more in line with what the raw data suggested as presented 
in Figure 1. The bottom panel provides the resultant FE-IV estimate. While this approach 
leads to a large loss of precision, evidenced by the near tripling of the standard errors 
compared to the IV model, we still find a statistically significant effect of contract type on 
absenteeism. This is roughly 3 hours a week and statistically significant at the 10% level. 
While imprecise this indicates that re-assignment to permanent contract by these policies had 
a marked increase in within worker absence behaviour.  
14 
 
Taken together, our results suggest that the previous OLS and FE estimates of 





The Economic Magnitude of Contract Effects on Absence – An Illustrative Example 
To this point, we have demonstrated that a robust contract effect on worker absence; and one 
that is markedly larger than previously reported in the literature. What is missing here, and 
from the literature in general, is an idea of the economic magnitude of these effects. As a 
result, how much these differences in estimated absence effects matters.  Specifically, we are 
interested in the effect of the re-assignment of workers from temporary to permanent 
contracts on worker productivity.  One way of doing this would be to examine the effects of 
absence on wages as below:  
itititiit XAW  log   (3) 
itititiit XTCA        (4) 
where the key parameter of interest is  , which provides the effect of absence on wages. 
This model is identified by an exclusion restriction, here that temporary contracts have no, 
conditional on observables, direct effect on wages/productivity.  
One initial complication is that there is no wage information in the LSLFS, hence 
there is no way of directly linking contract re-assignment, absence and wages. To get around 
this problem we exploit a further representative data set for Spain, the Wage Structure Survey 
(WSS) of 2002 and 2006. This provides information on, amongst other things, individual 
wages and type of contract (but not absence). Provided that the underlying populations are 
equivalent and the sample moments are independent these two data sets can be combined and 
the absence effect of temporary workers reassignment to permanent contracts on wages can 
be estimated via two samples two stage least squares (Angrist and Krueger, 1992) such that: 
                                                          
12 The focus on absence may seem to miss one key component of worker effort choices, overtime work 
(Engellandt and Riphahn, 2005). In unreported estimates we also examined the effect of permanent work on all 
variations in working hours (i.e. including positive variations from usual hours as well as absence). As might be 
expected this increases our permanent contract effects (i.e. temporary workers are also more likely to work 




itititiit XTCW  log  (5) 
itititiit XTCA      (6) 
To implement this approach we first estimate the effect of being employed on a 
temporary contract on wages (5) using the WSS data, where itW  is the logarithm of the wage 
per hour of individual i at time t. itTC is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual is 
employed on a temporary contract and 0 if on a permanent contract. itX  represents a set of 
standard control variables.  
Second, we estimate the effect of temporary employment on absenteeism (6) where, 
for ease of estimation and interpretation, we use the minutes difference absence indicator 
( itA ) which provides the number of minutes that individual i is absent at time t. itTC is a 
dummy that takes value 1 if the individual is employed on a temporary contract and 0 if on a 
permanent one. itX  represents age, education, gender and labour market characteristics such 
as whether the individual works in the public sector, tenure, occupation, sectoral, regional 
and year dummies. 





 is identical to the 2SLS   coefficient in 
Equation (3) for the exactly identified case where we have as many instruments (temporary 
contract) as potential endogenous variables (absenteeism). This will give us a LATE estimate 
of absenteeism on wages for those workers that change employment contract (are reassigned 
from a temporary to a permanent job). Given that our estimate is a non linear combination of 
estimators we apply the delta method to compute the standard errors (Van Kippersluis et al., 
2011 and Devereux and Hart, 2010). 
In equilibrium temporary workers, who work harder, should earn more. However, in 
practice because contract assignment is non-random (i.e. more able workers are likely to be 
offered permanent contracts) and may have a dynamic influence on productivity (for instance 
temporary workers are offered less training, see Arulampalam and Booth, 1998 and Draca 
and Green, 2004) temporary workers are generally observed to earn less (Booth et al, 2002).
13
 
This is not surprising as it is these particular types of issues which have motivated our 
                                                          
13
 In the WSS full sample permanent workers earn on average 13.5 Euros an hour, while temporary workers 
earn only 9.42 Euros per hour. 
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identification strategy in the earlier parts of the paper. However, due to the lack of 
longitudinal element to the WSS we do not have the same identification options available. As 
a result, we adopt a different strategy which is to look for a group of workers where training 
opportunities are relatively unimportant and where there should not be marked variation in 
underlying individual productivity. Specifically, we focus on young (<30 years) unskilled (no 
post-compulsory education) workers in the construction industry. This is a large group of 
workers in the time frame of our data which was characterised by quite extensive use of 
temporary contracts. For instance we have 89,484 person-time observations of these workers 
in the LSLFS and 62% are temporary contracted workers. The absence differentials between 
contract types for this group is similar to our private sector, short tenure sample; minutes 
difference equals 234.52 for permanent contract workers and 197.84 for temporary contract 
workers.  
INSERT TABLE 4 
The resultant estimates of (5) and (6) are reported in Table 4. The first panel shows a 
conditional wage premium to be on a temporary contract of roughly 2.87% for our 
construction sample. In the lower panel we report temporary contract effects on absence. The 
first are those (OLS and IV) from our full sample as per Tables 2 and 3. The second are 
corresponding estimates for the young, unskilled construction worker sample. These latter 
estimates again reveal a relationship between contract type and absence in the order of 13 
minutes (OLS) and 211 minutes (IV), although the subsequent computed ˆ  suffer from a 
loss of precision.
14
 With this information we can generate a range of estimates of absence 
effects on wages. These are reported as ˆ  with corresponding standard errors. These point 
estimates provide the effect of one minute’s absence on wages. For instance, the subsample 
OLS estimates would suggest productivity losses of 0.22% for a minute’s absence, or scaled 
up to 13.44% for an hour’s absence. If instead, we use the IV estimates of contract effects on 
absence this provide a substantially lower productivity loss from re-assignment from 
temporary to permanent contract of 0.014% for a minutes absence, or 0.84% for an hour’s 
absence. The magnitudes of these estimates are similar if we use the more precise full-sample 
temporary contract on absence coefficients.  
                                                          
14





The strong employment protection found in many areas of Europe has the potential to 
dramatically influence labour market performance and outcomes. For instance, a large 
literature has demonstrated the effects of these regimes on labour productivity and 
unemployment. Less well understood is employment protections’ behavioural effect on 
workers. A recent literature has developed examining how employment protection conditions 
worker effort. This literature has shown an effect of employment protection on absenteeism, 
but one that appears too small in magnitude to generate large differences in labour 
productivity. In practice, identifying causal effects of employment protection on effort is 
difficult, especially in a broad labour market setting. Our paper used a combination of within 
worker estimation and legislative changes in Spain as a source of exogenous variation in 
contract type to identify this causal effect. 
We demonstrate large effects of temporary contract on worker absence. For instance, 
our fixed effects IV estimates reveal that workers whose contracts are reassigned from 
temporary to permanent take 0.3 day more absence per week. This finding is robust to a range 
of sub-samples, and attempts to address issues related to the appropriate control group. This 
evidence suggests that variations in employment protection can have a marked effect on 
worker effort, which in turn will influence cross-country labour productivity. For instance, 
Dolado et al., (2011) attribute 20% of the slowdown of TFP growth in Spanish manufacturing 
firms to the reduction in conversion rates. Finally, we provide estimates of the productivity 
cost of absence associated with different employment contracts for a specific subsample of 
workers. Future work, with more advantageous data, could expand this analysis of 
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Figure 1. Temporary employees as percentage of the total number of employees in Spain, the 
















































Figure 2a. Minutes Absence, Temporary and Permanent Workers in Spain, 1994 – 































Figure 2b. Absence Rate, Temporary and Permanent Workers in Spain, 1994 – 2010 




























Table 1. Effect of temporary contracts on absence behaviour in Spain, 2002-2008 
 General Absence 
 Ext margin Intensive margin 
  Minutes difference Absence rate 
Temporary contract -0.016 -43.218 -0.016 
 (0.001)*** (1.377)*** (0.001)*** 
Female 0.031 49.560 0.031 
 (0.001)*** (1.295)*** (0.001)*** 
Married 0.015 20.951 0.012 
 (0.001)*** (1.380)*** (0.001)*** 
Second Education 0.000 -1.117 -0.001 
 (0.001) (1.482) (0.001) 
Higher Education 0.007 9.103 0.002 
 (0.001)*** (1.703)*** (0.001)*** 
Age 16-19 0.015 14.829 -0.005 
 (0.006)** (9.491) (0.005) 
Age 20-24 0.014 20.363 -0.004 
 (0.006)** (9.219)** (0.004) 
Age 25-29 0.016 31.608 -0.002 
 (0.006)*** (9.192)*** (0.004) 
Age 30-34 0.025 50.441 0.006 
 (0.006)*** (9.195)*** (0.004) 
Age 35-39 0.021 39.843 0.003 
 (0.006)*** (9.192)*** (0.004) 
Age 40-44 0.012 20.321 -0.006 
 (0.006)** (9.175)** (0.004) 
Age 45-49 0.007 14.636 -0.009 
 (0.006) (9.158) (0.004)** 
Age 50-54 0.012 27.487 -0.002 
 (0.006)** (9.163)*** (0.004) 
Age 55-59 0.025 54.196 0.012 
 (0.006)*** (9.228)*** (0.004)*** 
Age 60-64 0.040 82.811 0.029 
 (0.006)*** (9.593)*** (0.005)*** 
Public Sector 0.028 58.006 0.023 
 (0.001)*** (2.365)*** (0.001)*** 
Tenure 0.000 0.498 0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.017)*** (0.000)*** 
Tenure
2 
-0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Observations 1399824 1399824 1430511 
Note: Controls for industry, workers’ occupation, quarter, year  and region are included but not reported. Robust 







Table 2. Effect of temporary contracts on absence behaviour in Spain, OLS and Fixed Effects 
Estimates 2002-2008, private sector workers with   5years tenure. 
 All Workers Full Time Only 
 OLS FE OLS FE 
Extensive Margin -0.008 -0.013 -0.007 -0.017 
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** 
Minutes difference -18.926 -14.966 -13.034 -16.074 
 (1.691)*** (3.200)*** (1.982)*** (3.845)*** 
Absence rate -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
Observations 625295 625295 527985 527985 
Note: All controls as per Table 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 






Table 3. OLS, Fixed effects and IV estimates of the effect of temporary contracts on absence 
behaviour in Spain, 2002-2008. Private sector workers with   5years tenure. 
Panel A. First Stage: Probability of Temporary Contract 
 Pool Fixed effects 
 OLS IV FE FE-IV 
     
2002 Reform  -0.060*** -0.038*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
2006 Reform  -0.020*** -0.072** 
(0.002) (0.037) 
Panel B. Second Stage: Effect of Temporary Contract on absence 
 Pool Fixed effects 
 OLS IV FE FE-IV 
     
Extensive Margin -0.007 -0.011 -0.011 -0.436 
(0.001)*** (0.030) (0.002)*** (0.084)*** 
 
Minutes difference -19.798 -144.343 -12.152 -187.524 
(1.620)*** (41.760)*** (3.048)*** (113.965)* 
 
Absence rate -0.006 -0.074 -0.004 -0.098 
(0.001)*** (0.018)*** (0.001)*** (0.051)* 
Observations 726655 726655 726655 726655 
     
Note: All controls as per Table 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 







Table 4. Estimates of the effect of absence on productivity 
SAMPLE 1 – EES ˆ   ˆV    
itititiit XTCW  log  0.028728 0.000254   
SAMPLE 2 – LSLFS ˆ   ˆV  ˆ  S.E. 
itititiit XTCA        
OLS 
-19.798 2.625 -0.00145 0.000814 
IV 
-144.343 1744.043 -0.0002 0.000125 
OLS (subsample) 
-12.814 22.642 -0.00224 0.001497 
IV (subsample) 
-211.900 15571.983 -0.00014 0.00011 




































Appendix. Table A1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables All workers Temporary Permanent 
Ext. margin 0.214 0.187 0.226 
 (0.410) (0.390) (0.418) 
Minutes 
difference 
270.175 206.833 296.905 
 (647.250) (551.191) (681.986) 
Absence rate 0.122 0.097 0.133 
 (0.290) (0.253) (0.304) 
Temporary 
contract 
0.297 1.000 0.000 
 (0.457) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female 0.431 0.468 0.415 
 (0.495) (0.499) (0.493) 
Married 0.566 0.394 0.639 
 (0.496) (0.489) (0.480) 
Primary Educ 0.451 0.423 0.520 
 (0.497) (0.494) (0.500) 
Second Educ 0.217 0.208 0.221 
 (0.412) (0.406) (0.415) 
Higher Educ 0.332 0.272 0.357 
 (0.471) (0.445) (0.479) 
Age 16-19 0.024 0.063 0.007 
 (0.153) (0.244) (0.086) 
Age 20-24 0.098 0.194 0.057 
 (0.297) (0.396) (0.232) 
Age 25-29 0.139 0.201 0.113 
 (0.346) (0.401) (0.317) 
Age 30-34 0.135 0.144 0.131 
 (0.341) (0.351) (0.337) 
Age 35-39 0.137 0.121 0.143 
 (0.344) (0.327) (0.351) 
Age 40-44 0.139 0.104 0.154 
 (0.346) (0.305) (0.361) 
Age 45-49 0.125 0.076 0.146 
 (0.331) (0.265) (0.353) 
Age 50-54 0.098 0.050 0.119 
 (0.298) (0.219) (0.323) 
Age 55-59 0.070 0.031 0.086 
 (0.255) (0.173) (0.281) 
Age 60-64 0.031 0.013 0.039 
 (0.174) (0.112) (0.194) 
Public Sector 0.222 0.172 0.243 
30 
 
 (0.415) (0.377) (0.429) 
 
   
   
Tenure 111.608 24.397 148.409 
 (122.301) (45.693) (125.795) 
Observations 1399824 415407 984417 
 
 
